Results: Under the assumption of self-regarding preferences, the Nash equilibrium is 56 zero contribution by all in public account using backward induction. However, we 57 found contributions did not reduce to zero over all three sessions. Besides, the 
Xunzhou Ma: Corresponding author: Telephone: +86 15208443440. E-mail: 9 pooreco@163.com.
10
Fengwei Sun: Telephone: +86 18980472795. E-mail: xzsr930715@163.com.
11
Xiaoxiao Wang: Telephone: +86 18583869137. E-mail: 449230069@qq.com.
12
Quanlan Yi: Telephone: +86 18030433051. E-mail: 767009375@qq.com.
13
Mengliang Wu: Telephone: +86 13678052983. E-mail: mengliang1201@163.com .   14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40 This work was supported by the Academic Degree Program of Applied Economics, Southwest 41
University for Nationalities under Grant [number 2014XWD-S0202] and Program of Business and 42
Innovation under Grant [number 201510656008] . 43 sourced from WVS and regarding family status information, to combine with our own 126 questions (Prosocial Preference Survey, PPS. See Table 7 ). All the questions were 127 grouped into five independent sections that can provide measurements of dimensions influence on the ethnic behavioral difference more completely.
138
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces our experimental design.
139
Section 3 first provides the results of investigations into behavioral differences in 144  145  146  147  148  149  150  151  152  153  154  155  156  157  158  159  160  161  162  163  164  165  166  167  168  169 2. Experimental Design
170
The experiment was conducted at the Southwest University for Nationalities,
171
China. A total of 90 subjects were equally divided between three ethnicities. Our 172 sampling has the following considerations. First, we selected subjects from the ethnic
173
Han group, which is the majority, and from two ethnic minority groups, the ethnic 174 Zang, which is the largest minority group, and the ethnic Bouyei, which is a relatively 175 small minority group in China, to make a greater variation in ethnic population scales 2 . Psychology, Physics, Linguistics and Business.
188
The whole experiment was divided into two phases with 45 participants in each rounds of public good provision games in total. In the first treatment session, all the 192 subjects were randomly divided into 9 groups, and every group had 5 subjects who
193
were aware that they played in a group comprised of different ethnicities (labeled
194
'diverse group'). In the second treatment session, the subjects were randomly divided 195 within a sample of their own ethnicity (labeled 'homogeneous group'). In the third 196 treatment session, we firstly randomly selected 9 subjects equally from three 197 ethnicities and then matched every subject with 4 other subjects different from his/her 198 ethnic affiliation from the rest of the subjects (labeled 'one ethnicity dominant group').
199
To avoid the order effect, in the second phase, we conducted the treatment sessions in 
We followed the experimental design of Neugebauer, Perote, Schmidt and Malte 
232

Results
233
In this section, we provide detailed descriptions and statistical tests of the results.
234
We focused on the behavioral differences from the experiment in Section 3. However, another possible reason to explain the reduction in contribution over time is that subjects are willing to punish free-riders. The less contribution he/she makes to the group account, the less payoff is received by the free-riders from free-riding. This is a potential way to punish free-riders in public good experiments without a punishment mechanism design, and humans reciprocate wrongs by harming the offender, even at a cost to themselves (Fehr and 
322
We also found the evidence that group structure played an important role in 
By decomposing culture, The results showed that the cultural factors also The adjusted R 2 of the regression model is far below 1 also indicated there were still other potential variables accounting for culture that we did not identify. 
472
(3) Actually, we had not addressed GS (group structure), which we viewed as a 473 very important implicit cultural factor for measuring ethnic identity (ethnic prejudice).
474
We generated various composition of groups in terms of ethnic proportions to 
549
Culture is a useful variable to uncover economic behavior, and a stream of doctrine and variability in concerned deities and this may also influence prosociality.
558
Our results on the market interaction from the whole sample contradicted the findings regressed the three ethnic affiliation samples separately, the results were multi-faceted.
564
The results showed that the coefficients of MI are negative (-1.54 (p<0.01) for the Table 1 779
Descriptions of variables.
780
Variable Description
CB
Contribution to group account
Z-CB
Mean contribution to group account of all ethnic Zang subjects over 10 rounds in all sessions
By-CB
Mean contribution to group account of all ethnic Bouyei subjects over 10 rounds in all sessions
H-CB
Mean contribution to group account of all ethnic Han subjects over 10 rounds in all sessions
Total-CB Mean contribution to group account of all subjects over 10 rounds in all sessions
Guess
Guess value of mean group contribution
Z-Guess
Mean guess value of all ethnic Zang subjects over 10 rounds in all sessions
By-Guess
Mean guess value of all ethnic Bouyei subjects over 10 rounds in all sessions
H-Guess
Mean guess value of all ethnic Han subjects of over 10 rounds in all sessions
Total-Guess
Mean guess value of all subjects over 10 rounds in all sessions
AVReal
Mean contribution to group account of five subjects in a group 
GS
Experimental Instruction
885
The instructions were read aloud by an experimenter as the students followed 886 along on their computer screens.
887
This is an experiment, funded by a research foundation to study decision making. The instructions are simple. If you follow them carefully, you may earn a considerable amount of money which will be paid to you in cash at the end of experiment and the amount you earn will depend on you and other's decisions. Please make sure you understand the decision process and remember any communication is forbidden.
Group You are about to participate experiment of a group decision-making that consists of three sessions, and every session includes 10 rounds, in other words, you will complete 30 rounds. During each round, you will be placed in a group with other four participants (a group of five). You will not know the identities of the other four members of your group in any given decision round, nor will you be told their identities after the experiment is over. At the beginning of each round, groups will be randomly assigned that you have no chance to meet the same person in any other round, i.e., group composition will be randomly changed from round to round. Moreover, you will not know additional information that we will not provide during the whole process. Earnings You will receive an initial endowment of 50 token (1 token= 1RMB (0.16US$)) in each round and have to decide on the allocation of your endowment between a private and public good. Each token placed in private one earns one token back while each token placed to public good earn 0.5 times token to each member of group. Your payoff will be determined as:
In addition to, you will be asked to guess the mean group contribution after decision-making in allocation in each round. Your payoff from guessing will be determined as follows (in RMB):
However, the calculation may be kind of complicated, note that the closer your guess is to the average group contribution, the higher is your payoff. Your total payoff in each round includes the payoff from the group decision as well as from guessing. At the end of the experiment, your earning is the average total payoff in 30 rounds. In each round, you will allowed to have 2 minutes to make decision, and if it is not enough, please let us know and more minutes will be allowed. Scenarios You belong to a different ethnicity. The experiment includes three sessions and each session corresponds to a single scenario. The scenario in the first session is that all of you are randomly divided into several groups and have to be aware that you play in a group probably with participants from different ethnicities. In the second session, you play in a group in which all the other participants belong to the ethnicity of your own. At the beginning of each round in third session, we will randomly select several participants. If you are selected, you will play in a group with other four participants belong to an ethnicity different from yours, and if not, you will play in a group with four other participants, only one of whom belongs to a different ethnicity from yours.
There will be some key questions which test whether you are familiar with the experiment institution. Our experimenters will check your answers and rectify the wrong ones with explanation, and if you have any more questions, please ask them before the experiment begins. GOOD LUCK !   888  889  890  891  892  893  894  895  896  897  898  899  900  901  902  903  904  905  906  907  908  909  910  911  912  913  914  915  916  917  918  919  920  921  922  923  924  925 
